th Spain the President proclaimed that the United States would
consider itself bound for the duration by the last three principles of
the Declaration of Paris, a course which, as Professor Wright observes,
"would doubtless go far toward establishing these three principles as
international law obligatory upon the United States in future
wars."[229] Hostilities with Spain were brought to an end in August 1898
by an armistice the conditions of which largely determined the
succeeding treaty of peace,[230] just as did the Armistice of November
11, 1918, determine in great measure the conditions of the final peace
with Germany in 1918. It was also President McKinley who in 1900,
relying on his own sole authority as Commander in Chief, contributed a
land force of 5,000 men and a naval force to cooperate with similar
contingents from other Powers to rescue the legations in Peking from the
Boxers; and a year later, again without consulting either Congress or
the Senate, accepted for the United States the Boxer Indemnity Protocol
between China and the intervening Powers.[231] Commenting on the Peking
protocol Willoughby quotes with approval the following remark: "This
case is interesting, because it shows how the force of circumstances
compelled us to adopt the European practice with reference to an
international agreement, which, aside from the indemnity question, was
almost entirely political in character. * * *, purely political treaties
are, under constitutional practice in Europe, usually made by the
executive alone. The situation in China, however, abundantly justified
President McKinley in not submitting the protocol to the Senate. The
remoteness of Pekin, the jealousies between the allies, and the shifting
evasive tactics of the Chinese Government, would have made impossible
anything but an agreement on the spot."[232]

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AFFECTING FAR EASTERN RELATIONS

It was during this period, too, that John Hay, as McKinley's Secretary
of State, initiated his "Open Door" policy, by notes to Great Britain,
Germany, and Russia, which were soon followed by similar notes to
France, Italy and Japan. These in substance asked the recipients to
declare formally that they would not seek to enlarge their respective
interests in China at the expense of any of the others; and all
responded favorably.[233] Then in 1905 the first Roosevelt, seeking to
arrive at a diplomatic understanding with Japan, instigated an exchange
of