nsistently with the Constitution of the United
States and that of New York. The Court, speaking by Justice Douglas,
brushed these arguments aside. An official declaration of the Russian
government itself settled the question of the extraterritorial operation
of the Russian decree of nationalization and was binding on American
courts. The power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as
settlement of claims of our nationals was "a modest implied power of the
President who is the 'sole organ of the Federal Government in the field
of international relations' * * * It was the judgment of the political
department that full recognition of the Soviet Government required the
settlement of outstanding problems including the claims of our
nationals. * * * We would usurp the executive function if we held that
that decision was not final and conclusive on the courts. 'All
constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the
judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if
they proceeded from the legislature, * * *'[243] * * * It is, of
course, true that even treaties with foreign nations will be carefully
construed so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of
the States of this nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the
national policy.[244] But State law must yield when it is inconsistent
with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an
international compact or agreement.[245] Then, the power of a State to
refuse enforcement of rights based on foreign law which runs counter to
the public policy of the form * * * must give way before the superior
Federal policy evidenced by a treaty or international compact or
agreement.[246] * * * The action of New York in this case amounts in
substance to a rejection of a part of the policy underlying recognition
by this nation of Soviet Russia. Such power is not accorded a State in
our constitutional system. To permit it would be to sanction a dangerous
invasion of Federal authority. For it would 'imperil the amicable
relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.'[247] * * *
It would tend to disturb that equilibrium in our foreign relations which
the political departments of our national government has diligently
endeavored to establish. * * * No State can rewrite our foreign policy
to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs is
not shared by the States; it is vested in the national g
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