cretary was in
reality nothing but the scribe; he was the pen in the President's hand,
and no more. Nothing depended on his discretion, his judgment, or his
responsibility. The removal, indeed, has been admitted and defended in
the Senate, as the direct act of the President himself. This, Sir, is
what I call assumption of power. If the President had issued an order
for the removal of the deposits in his own name, and under his own hand,
it would have been an illegal order, and the bank would not have been at
liberty to obey it. For the same reason, if the Secretary's order had
recited that it was issued by the President's direction, and on the
President's authority, it would have shown on its face that it was
illegal and invalid. No one can doubt that. The act of removal, to be
lawful, must be the _bona fide_ act of the Secretary; _his_ judgment,
the result of _his_ deliberations, the volition of _his_ mind. All are
able to see the difference between the power to remove the Secretary
from office, and the power to control him, in all or any of his duties,
while in office. The law charges the officer, whoever he may be, with
the performance of certain duties. The President, with the consent of
the Senate, appoints an individual to be such officer; and this
individual he may remove, if he so please; but, until removed, he is the
officer, and remains charged with the duties of his station, duties
which nobody else can perform, and for the neglect or violation of which
he is liable to be impeached.

The distinction is visible and broad between the power of removal and
the power to control an officer not removed. The President, it is true,
may terminate his political life; but he cannot control his powers and
functions, and act upon him as a mere machine, while he is allowed to
live. The power of control and direction, nowhere given, certainly, by
any express provision of the Constitution or laws, is derived, by those
who maintain it, from the right of removal; that is to say, it is a
constructive power; it has no express warrant in the Constitution. A
very important power, then, is raised by construction in the first
place; and being thus raised, it becomes a fountain out of which other
important powers, raised also by construction, are to be supplied. There
is no little danger that such a mode of reasoning may be carried too
far. It cannot be maintained that the power of direct control
necessarily flows from the power of re