of the delegates at the Conference have been
eulogized, not for what they actually did, but for what it is assumed
they are desirous of achieving. Toward Russia they played the same game
that their allies were playing there and in Europe, only more frankly
and systematically. They applied the two principal maxims which lie at
the root of international politics to-day--_do ut des_, and the nation
that is capable of leading others has the right and the duty to lead
them. And they established a valuable reputation for fulfilling their
compacts conscientiously. Nippon, then, would have helped her Russian
neighbors, and she expected to be helped by them in return. Have not the
Allies, she asked, compelled Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia to
pay them in cash for their emancipation?

Russians, who have no color prejudices, hit it off with the Japanese, by
whom they are liked in return. That the two peoples should feel drawn to
each other politically is, therefore, natural, and that they will strike
up economic agreements in the future seems to many inevitable and
legitimate. One such agreement was on the point of being signed between
them and the anti-Bolshevists of Omsk immediately after, and in
consequence of, the Allies' ill-considered invitation to Lenin and
Trotzky to delegate representatives to Prinkipo. This convention, I have
reason to believe, was actually drafted, and was about to be signed. And
the adverse influence that suddenly made itself felt and hindered the
compact came not from Russia, but from western Europe. It would be
unfruitful to dwell further on this matter here, beyond recording the
belief of many Russians that the zeal of the English-speaking peoples
for the well-being of Siberia, where they intend to maintain troops
after having withdrawn them from Europe, is the counter-move to Japan's
capacity and wish to co-operate with the population of that rich
country. This assumption may be groundless, but it will surprise only
those who fail to note how often the flag of principle is unfurled over
economic interests.

The delegates were not all discouraged by their discomfiture over the
Prinkipo project. Some of them still hankered after an agreement with
the Bolshevists which would warrant them in including the Russian
problem among the tasks provisionally achieved. President Wilson
despatched secret envoys to Moscow to strike up an accord with
Lenin,[268] but although the terms which Mr. Bullitt o