without the knowledge of their authorized representatives in Paris, just
as they had issued peremptory orders to "the Rumanian government at
Bucharest" over the heads of its chiefs, who were actually in the French
capital.

The proximate motives that determined several important decisions of
the Secret Council, although of no political moment, are of sufficient
psychological interest to warrant mention. They shed a light on the
concreteness, directness, and simplicity of the workings of the
statesmen's minds when engaged in transacting international business.
For example, the particular moment for the recognition of new
communities as states was fixed by wholly extrinsical circumstances. A
food-distributer, for instance, or the Secretary of a Treasury, wanted a
receipt for expenditure abroad from the people that benefited by it. As
a document of this character presupposes the existence of a state and a
government, the official dispenser of food or money was loath to go to
the aid of any nation which was not a state or which lacked a properly
constituted government. Hence, in some cases the Conference had to
create both on the spur of the moment. Thus the reason why Finland's
independence received the hall-mark of the Powers when it did was
because the United States government was generously preparing to give
aid to the Finns and had to get in return proper receipts signed by
competent authorities representing the state.[270] Had it not been for
this immediate need of valid receipts, the act of recognition might have
been postponed in the same way as was the marking off of the frontiers.
And like considerations led to like results in other cases.
Czechoslovakia's independence was formally recognized for the same
reason, as one of its leading men frankly admitted.

One of the serious worries of the Conference chiefs in their dealings
with Russia was the lack of a recognized government there, qualified to
sign receipts for advances of money and munitions. And as they could not
resolve to accord recognition to any of the existing administrations,
they hit upon the middle course, that of promoting the anti-Bolshevists
to the rank of a community, not, indeed, sovereign or independent, but
deserving of every kind of assistance except the despatch of Allied
troops. Assistance was already being given liberally, but the necessity
was felt for justifying it formally. And the two delegates went to work
as though they were hatchin