ir own authority, provisional. A similar reply was
made to the Esthonians; to this those peoples demurred. The Russians
stood firm and the negotiations fell through. It is to be supposed that
when they have recovered their former status they will prove more
amenable to the blandishments of the Allies than they were to the
powerful bribe dangled before their eyes by the Esthonians and the
Finns?
But if the improvised arrangements entailing dismemberment which the
Great Powers imposed on Russia during her cataleptic trance are revised,
as they may be, whenever she recovers consciousness and strength, what
course will events then follow? If she seeks to regather under her wing
some of the peoples whose complete independence the League of Nations
was so eager to guarantee, will that body respond to the appeal of these
and fly to their assistance? Russia, who has not been consulted, will
not be as bound by the canons of the League, and one need not be a
prophet to foretell the reluctance of Western armies to wage another war
in order to prevent territories, of which some of the plenipotentiaries
may have heard as little as of Teschen, becoming again integral parts of
the Slav state. Europe may then see its political axis once more shifted
and its outlook obscured. Thus the system of equilibrium, which was
theoretically abolished by the Fourteen Points, may be re-established by
the hundred and one economico-political changes which Russia's recovery
will contribute to bring about.
A decade is but a twinkling in the history of a nation. Within a few
years Russia may once more be united. The army that will have achieved
this feat will constitute a formidable weapon in the hands of the state
that wields it. As everything, even military strength, is relative, and
as the armies of the rest of Europe will not be impatient to fight in
the East, and will therefore count for considerably less than their
numbers, there will be no real danger of an invasion. Russia is a
country easy to get into, but hard to get out of, and military success
against its armies there would in verity be a victory without glory,
annexation, indemnities, or other appreciable gains.
It is hard to believe that the distinguished statesmen of the Conference
took these eventualities fully into account before attempting to reshape
amorphous Russia after their own vague ideal. But whether we assess
their work by the standards of political science or of internati
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