pent money
freely, nay, wasted it woefully.

And yet M. Klotz should have known better. For he was supplied with
definite data to go upon. In October, 1918, the French government, in
doubt about the full significance of that one of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen
Points which dealt with reparations, asked officially for explanations,
and received from Mr. Lansing the answer by telegraph that it involved
the making good by the enemy of all losses inflicted directly and
lawlessly upon civilians, but none other. That surely was a plain answer
and a just principle. But, in accordance with the practice of secrecy in
vogue among Allied European governments, the nation was not informed of
these restrictive conditions, but was allowed to hug dangerous
delusions.

But the Ministers knew them, and M. Klotz was a Minister. Not only,
however, did he not reveal what he knew, but he behaved as though his
information was of a directly contrary tenor, and he also stated that
Germany must also refund the war indemnities of 1870, capitalized down
to November, 1918, and he set down the sum at fifty milliards of
francs. This procedure was not what reasonably might have been expected
from the leader of a heroic nation stout-hearted enough to face
unpleasant facts. Some of the leading spirits in the country, despite
the intensity of their feelings toward Germany, disapproved this kind of
bookkeeping, but M. Klotz did not relinquish his method of keeping
accounts. He drew up a bill against the Teutons for one thousand and
eighty-six milliards of francs.

The Germans at the Conference maintained that if the wealth of their
nation were realized and liquid, it would amount at most to four hundred
milliards, but that to realize it would involve the stripping of the
population of everything--of its forests, its mines, its railways, its
factories, its cattle, its houses, its furniture, and its ready money.
They further pleaded that the territorial clauses of the Treaty deprived
them of important resources, which would reduce their solvency to a
greater degree than the Allies realized. These clauses dispossessed the
nation of 21 per cent. of the total crops of cereals and potatoes. A
further falling off in the quantities of food produced would result from
the restrictions on the importation of raw materials for the manufacture
of fertilizers. Of her coal, Germany was forfeiting about one-third;
three-fourths of her iron ore was also being taken away from h