ed by the sole force of right. But in this case Germany would
have had to be treated so considerately as to leave her no grievance to
brood over. M. Clemenceau hindered Mr. Wilson from displaying sufficient
generosity to get the moral peace, and Mr. Wilson on his side prevented
M. Clemenceau from exercising severity enough to secure the material
peace. And so the result, which it was easy to foresee, is a regime
devoid of the real guaranties of durability."[328]
The judge of the French syndicalists was still more severe. "The
Versailles peace," exclaimed M. Verfeuil, "is worse than the peace of
Brest-Litovsk ... annexations, economic servitudes, overwhelming
indemnities, and a caricature of the Society of Nations--these
constitute the balance of the new policy,"[329] The Deputy Marcel Cachin
said: "The Allied armies fought to make this war the last. They fought
for a just and lasting peace, but none of these boons has been bestowed
on us. We are confronted with the failure of the policy of the one man
in whom our party had put its confidence--President Wilson. The peace
conditions ... are inacceptable from various points of view, financial,
territorial, economic, social, and human."[330]
It is in this Treaty far more than in the Covenant that the principles
to which Mr. Wilson at first committed himself are in decisive issue.
True, he was wont after every surrender he made during the Conference to
invoke the Covenant and its concrete realization--the League of
Nations--as the corrective which would set everything right in the
future. But the fact can hardly be blinked that it is the Treaty and its
effects that impress their character on the Covenant and not the other
way round. As an eminent Swiss professor observed: "No league of nations
would have hindered the Belgian people in 1830 from separating from
Holland. Can the future League of Nations hinder Germany from
reconstituting its geographical unity? Can it hinder the Germans of
Bohemia from smiting the Czech? Can it prevent the Magyars, who at
present are scattered, from working for their reunion?"[331]
These potential disturbances are so many dangers to France. For if war
should break out in eastern Europe, is it to be supposed that the United
States, the British colonies, or even Britain herself will send troops
to take part in it? Hardly. Suppose, for instance, that the Austrians,
who ardently desire to be merged in Germany, proclaim their union with
her, a
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