execrate their ex-Allies
and turn to the Germans and the Japanese.
"The resettlement of central Europe," writes an American journal,[376]
"is not being made for the tranquillity of the liberated principles,
but for the purposes of the Great Powers, among whom France is the
active, and America and Britain the passive, partners. In Germany its
purpose is the permanent elimination of the German nation as a factor in
European politics.... We cannot save Europe by playing the sinister game
now being played. There is no peace, no order, no security in it....
What it can do is to aggravate the mischief and intensify the schisms."
A distinguished American, who is a consistent friend of England,[377] in
a review article affirmed that the proposed League of Nations is slowly
undermining the Anglo-American Entente. "There is in America a growing
sense of irritation that she should be forever entangled in the
spider-web of European politics." ... And if the Senate in the supposed
interests of peace should ratify the League, he adds, "In my judgment no
greater harm could result to Anglo-American unity than such reluctant
consent."[378]
Some of Mr. Wilson's fellow-countrymen who gave him their whole-hearted
support when he undertook to establish a regime of right and justice sum
up the result of his labors in Paris as follows:[379]
"His solemn warning against special alliances emerged as a special
alliance with Britain and France. His repeated condemnations of secret
treaties emerges as a recognition that 'they could not honorably be
brushed aside,' even though they conflicted with equally binding public
engagements entered into after they had been written. Openly arrived at
covenants were not openly arrived at. The removal, so far as possible,
of all economic barriers was applied to German barriers, and
accompanied by the blockade of a people with whom we have never been at
war. The adequate guaranties to be given and taken as respects armaments
were taken from Germany and given to no one. The 'unhampered and
unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own
political development' promised to Russia, and defined as the 'acid
test,' has been worked out by Mr. Wilson and others to a point where so
cautious a man as Mr. Asquith says he regards it with 'bewilderment and
apprehension.' The righting of the wrong done in 1871 emerges as a
concealed annexation of the boundary of 1814. The 'clearly recognizable
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