luous to investigate the effect upon the
Russians, or, indeed, upon any of the peoples represented in Paris, of
the Secret Council's conspirative deliberations and circuitous
procedure, which were in such strong contrast to the "open covenants
openly arrived at" to which in their public speeches they paid such high
tribute.

The main danger, which the Allies redoubted from failure to restore
tranquillity in Russia, was that Germany might accomplish it and, owing
to her many advantages, might secure a privileged position in the
country and use it as a stepping-stone to material prosperity, military
strength, and political ascendancy. This feat she could accomplish
against considerable odds. She would achieve it easily if the Allies
unwittingly helped her, as they were doing.

Unfortunately the Allied governments had not much hope of succeeding.
If they had been capable of elaborating a comprehensive plan, they no
longer possessed the means of executing it. But they devised none. "The
fact is," one of the Conference leaders exclaimed, "we have no policy
toward Russia. Neither do we possess adequate data for one."

They strove to make good this capital omission by erecting a paper wall
between Germany and her great Slav neighbor. The plan was simple. The
Teutons were to be compelled to disinterest themselves in the affairs of
Russia, with whose destinies their own are so closely bound up. But they
soon realized that such a partition is useless as a breakwater against
the tidal wave of Teutondom, and Germany is still destined to play the
part of Russia's steward and majordomo.

How could it be otherwise? Germany and Russia are near neighbors. Their
economic relations have been continuous for ages, and the Allies have
made them indispensable in the future; Russia is ear-marked as Germany's
best colony. The two peoples are become interdependent. The Teuton will
recognize the Slav as an ally in economics, and will pay himself
politically. Who will now thwart or check this process? Russia must
live, and therefore buy and sell, barter and negotiate. Can a parchment
treaty hinder or invalidate her dealings? Can it prevent an admixture of
politics in commercial arrangements, seeing that they are but two
aspects of one and the same transaction? It is worthy of note that a
question which goes to the quick of the matter was never mooted. It is
this: Is it an essential element of the future ordering of the world
that Germany shall