February 20, 1917.

[257] As a matter of fact, the entire world knew and knows that she had
guaranteed the retrocession. Baron Makino declared it at the Conference.
Cf. _The_ (London) _Times_, February 13, 1919; also on May 5, 1919; and
Viscount Uchida confirmed it on May 17, 1919. It had also been stated in
the Japanese ultimatum to Germany, August 15, 1914, and repeated by
Viscount Uchida at the beginning of August, 1919.

[258] Mr. Thomas Millard, some of whose letters were published by _The
New York Times_. Cf. _Le Temps_, July 29, 1919.

[259] _The Chicago Tribune_ (Paris edition), August 20, 1919.

X

ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA

In their dealings with Russia the principal plenipotentiaries
consistently displayed the qualities and employed the standards, maxims,
and methods which had stood them in good stead as parliamentary
politicians. The betterment of the world was an idea which took a
separate position in their minds, quite apart from the other political
ideas with which they usually operated. Overflowing with verbal
altruism, they first made sure of the political and economic interests
of their own countries, safeguarding or extending these sources of
power, after which they proceeded to try their novel experiment on
communities which they could coerce into obedience. Hence the aversion
and opposition which they encountered among all the nations which had to
submit to the yoke, and more especially among the Russians.

Russia's opposition, widespread and deep-rooted, is natural, and history
will probably add that it was justified. It starts from the assumption,
which there is no gainsaying, that the Conference was convoked to make
peace between the belligerents and that whatever territorial changes it
might introduce must be restricted to the countries of the defeated
peoples. From all "disannexations" not only the Allies' territories, but
those of neutrals, were to be exempted. Repudiate this principle and the
demands of Ireland, Egypt, India to the benefits of self-determination
became unanswerable. Belgium's claim to Dutch Limburg and other
territorial oddments must likewise be allowed. Indeed, the plea actually
put forward against these was that the Conference was incompetent to
touch any territory actually possessed by either neutral or Allied
states. Ireland, Egypt, and Dutch Limburg Were all domestic matters with
which the Conference had no concern.

Despite this fundamental principle Russ