a's well-known phrase "sacred egotism." Viewed in
the former light, Japan's demand for Shantung was undoubtedly as much a
stride backward as were those of the United States and France for the
Monroe Doctrine and the Saar Valley respectively. But as the three Great
Powers had set the example, Japan was resolved from the outset to rebel
against any decree relegating her to the second-or third-class nations.
The position of equality occupied by her government among the
governments of other Great Powers did not extend to the Japanese nation
among the other nations. But her statesmen refused to admit this
artificial inferiority as a reason for descending another step in the
international hierarchy and they invoked the principle of which Britain,
France, and America had already taken advantage.

The Supreme Council, like Janus of old, possessed two faces, one
altruistic and the other egotistic, and, also like that son of Apollo,
held a key in its right hand and a rod in its left. It applied to the
various states, according to its own interest or convenience, the
principles of the old or the new Covenant, and would fain have
dispossessed Japan of the fruits of the campaign, and allotted to her
the role of working without reward in the vineyard of the millennium,
were it not that this policy was excluded by reasons of present
expediency and previous commitments. The expediency was represented by
President Wilson's determination to obtain, before returning to
Washington, some kind of a compact that might be described as the
constitution of the future society of nations, and by his belief that
this instrument could not be obtained without Japan's adherence, which
was dependent on her demand for Shantung being allowed. And the previous
commitments were the secret compacts concluded by Japan with Britain,
France, Russia, and Italy before the United States entered the war.

Nippon's role in the war and the circumstances that shaped it are
scarcely realized by the general public. They have been purposely thrust
in the background. And yet a knowledge of them is essential to those who
wish to understand the significance of the dispute about Shantung, which
at bottom was the problem of Japan's international status. Before
attempting to analyze them, however, it may not be amiss to remark that
during the French press campaign conducted in the years 1915-16, with
the object of determining the Tokio Cabinet to take part in the military
op