on with Zebehr. At least he ought to have known the Soudan,
but the dangers which had been clear to the eye of Gordon were
concealed from him and his colleagues. Still, the first task
he set himself--and indeed it was the justification of his
re-appointment--was to retrieve the disaster to Rashed, and to destroy
the Mahdi's power. He therefore collected a force of not less than
4000 men, chiefly trained infantry, and he entrusted the command to
Yusuf Pasha, a brave officer, who had distinguished himself under
Gessi in the war with Suleiman. This force left Khartoum in March
1882, but it did not begin its inland march from the Nile until the
end of May, when it had been increased by at least 2000 irregular
levies raised in Kordofan. Unfortunately, Yusuf was just as
over-confident as Rashed had been. He neglected all precautions, and
derided the counsel of those who warned him that the Mahdi's followers
might prove a match for his well-armed and well-drilled troops. After
a ten days' march he reached the neighbourhood of the Mahdi's
position, and he was already counting on a great victory, when, at
dawn of day on 7th June, he was himself surprised by his opponent in a
camp that he had ostentatiously refused to fortify in the smallest
degree. The Egyptian force was annihilated. Some of the local
irregulars escaped, but of the regular troops and their commanders not
one. This decisive victory not merely confirmed the reputation of the
Mahdi, and made most people in the Soudan believe that he was really a
heaven-sent champion, but it also exposed the inferiority of the
Government troops and the Khedive's commanders.

The defeat of Yusuf may be said to have been decisive so far as the
active forces of the Khedive in the field were concerned, but the
towns held out, and El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in particular
defied all the Mahdi's efforts to take it. The possession of this and
other strong places furnished the supporters of the Government with a
reasonable hope that on the arrival of fresh troops the ground lost
might be recovered, and an end put to what threatened to become a
formidable rebellion. A lull consequently ensued in the struggle.
Unfortunately, it was one that the Mahdi turned to the best advantage
by drilling and arming his troops, and summoning levies from the more
distant parts of the provinces, while the Khedive's Government,
engrossed in troubles nearer home--the Arabi revolt and the
intervention of