dmond O'Donovan, who had made himself famous a few
years earlier by reaching the Turcoman stronghold of Merv, were
ordered to accompany it, and report its achievements.
The Mahdi learnt in good time of the extensive preparations being made
for this expedition, but he was not dismayed, because all the fighting
tribes of Kordofan, Bahr Gazelle, and Darfour were now at his back,
and he knew that he could count on the devotion of 100,000 fanatical
warriors. Still, he and his henchman Abdullah, who supplied the
military brains to the cause, were not disposed to throw away a
chance, and the threatening appearance of the Egyptian military
preparations led them to conceive the really brilliant idea of
stirring up trouble in the rear of Khartoum. For this purpose a man
of extraordinary energy and influence was ready to their hand in Osman
Digma, a slave-dealer of Souakim, who might truly be called the Zebehr
of the Eastern Soudan. This man hastened to Souakim as the delegate of
the Mahdi, from whom he brought special proclamations, calling on the
tribes to rise for a Holy War. Although this move subsequently
aggravated the Egyptian position and extended the military triumphs of
the Mahdi, it did not attain the immediate object for which it was
conceived, as the Hicks Expedition set out on its ill-omened march
before Osman had struck a blow.
The power of the Mahdi was at this moment so firmly established, and
his reputation based on the double claim of a divine mission and
military success so high that it may be doubted whether the 10,000
men, of which the Hicks force consisted when the irregulars raised by
the Governor-General had joined it at Duem, would have sufficed to
overcome him even if they had been ably led, and escaped all the
untoward circumstances that first retarded their progress and then
sealed their fate. The plan of campaign was based on a misconception
of the Mahdi's power, and was carried out with utter disregard of
prudence and of the local difficulties to be encountered between the
Nile and El Obeid. But the radical fault of the whole enterprise was a
strategical one. The situation made it prudent and even necessary for
the Government to stand on the defensive, and to abstain from military
expeditions, while the course pursued was to undertake offensive
measures in the manner most calculated to favour the chances of the
Mahdi, and to attack him at the very point where his superiority could
be most certain
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