at Khartoum, under Colonel de Coetlogon, by Hicks Pasha, when he set
out on his unfortunate expedition. If the power of the Mahdi at this
moment were merely to be measured by comparison with the collapse of
authority, courage, and confidence of the titular upholders of the
Khedive's Government, it might be pronounced formidable. It had
sufficed to defeat every hostile effort made against it, and to
practically annihilate all the armies that Egypt could bring into the
field. Its extraordinary success was no doubt due to the incompetency,
over-confidence, and deficient military spirit and knowledge of the
Khedive's commanders and troops. But, while making the fullest
admission on these points, it cannot be disputed that some of the
elements in the Mahdi's power would have made it formidable, even if
the cause of the Government had been more worthily and efficiently
sustained. There is no doubt that, in the first place, he appealed to
races which thought they were overtaxed, and to classes whose only
tangible property had been assailed and diminished by the Anti-Slavery
policy of the Government. Even if it would be going too far to say
that Mahomed Ahmed, the long-looked-for Mahdi, was only a tool in the
hands of secret conspirators pledged to avenge Suleiman, to restore
Zebehr, and to bring back the good old times, when a fortune lay in
the easy acquisition of human ivory, there is no doubt that the
backbone of his power was provided by those followers of Suleiman,
whom Gordon had broken up at Shaka and driven from Dara. But the
Mahdi had supplied them in religious fanaticism with a more powerful
incentive than pecuniary gain, and when he showed them how easily they
might triumph over their opponents, he inspired them with a confidence
which has not yet lost its efficacy.
In 1884 all these inducements for the tribes of the Soudan to believe
in their religious leader were in their pristine strength. He had
succeeded in every thing he undertook, he had armed his countless
warriors with the weapons taken from the armies he had destroyed, and
he had placed at the disposal of his supporters an immense and
easily-acquired spoil. The later experiences of the Mahdists were to
be neither so pleasant nor so profitable, but at the end of 1883 they
were at the height of their confidence and power. It was at such a
moment and against such a powerful adversary that the British
Government thought it right to take advantage of the devo
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