peatedly said that they are
Egyptian officials, yet they have to keep on good terms with
these Foreign Offices. Not to the bondholders, though they are
bound, considering their power, to be on good terms with them.
Not to the inhabitants of Egypt, though these latter are taught
to believe that every unpopular act is done by the Controllers'
advice.
"The only remedy is by the formation of a Council of Notables,
having direct access to Tewfik, and independent of his or of the
Ministers' goodwill, and the subjection of the Controllers to the
Consul-Generals responsible to the Foreign Office--in fact,
Residents at the Court. This would be no innovation, for the
supervision exists now, except under the Controllers and
Consul-Generals. It is simply proposed to amalgamate Controllers
with Consul-Generals, and to give these latter the position of
Residents. By this means the continual change of French
Consul-Generals would be avoided, and the consequent ill-feeling
between France and England would disappear. Should the Residents
fall out, the matter would be easily settled by the Governments.
As it is at present, a quadruple combat goes on; sometimes it is
one Consul-General against the other Consul-General, aided by the
two Controllers, or a Consul-General and one Controller against
the other Consul-General and the other Controller, in all of
which combats Tewfik gains and the people lose.
"One thing should certainly be done--the giving of concessions
ought not to be in the power of Controllers, nor if
Consul-Generals are amalgamated with Controllers as Residents
should these Residents have this power. It ought to be exercised
by the Council of Notables, who would look to the welfare of the
people."
The progress of events in Lower Egypt during 1881 and 1882 was watched
with great care, whether he was vegetating in the Mauritius or
absorbed in the anxieties and labours of his South African mission.
Commenting on the downfall of Arabi, he explained how the despatch of
troops to the Soudan, composed of regiments tainted with a spirit of
insubordination, would inevitably aggravate the situation there. Later
on, in 1883, when he heard of Hicks being sent to take the command and
repair the defeat of Yusuf, he wrote:--"Unless Hicks is given supreme
command he is lost; it can never wor
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