y believed to be true. What is wonderful in such an
apology?

There are many things a man may hold, which at the same time he may
feel that he has no right to say publicly. The law recognises this
principle. In our own time, men have been imprisoned and fined for
saying true things of a bad king. The maxim has been held, that, "The
greater the truth, the greater is the libel." And so as to the
judgment of society, a just indignation would be felt against a
writer who brought forward wantonly the weaknesses of a great man,
though the whole world knew that they existed. No one is at liberty
to speak ill of another without a justifiable reason, even though he
knows he is speaking truth, and the public knows it too. Therefore I
could not speak ill against the Church of Rome, though I believed
what I said, without a good reason. I did believe what I said; but
had I a good reason for saying it? I thought I had, viz. I said what
I believed was simply necessary in the controversy, in order to
defend ourselves; I considered that the Anglican position could not
be defended, without bringing charges against the Church of Rome. Is
not this almost a truism? is it not what every one says, who speaks
on the subject at all? does any serious man abuse the Church of
Rome, for the sake of abusing her, or because it justifies his
own religious position? What is the meaning of the very word
"Protestantism," but that there is a call to speak out? This then is
what I said; "I know I spoke strongly against the Church of Rome; but
it was no mere abuse, for I had a serious reason for doing so."

But, not only did I think such language necessary for my Church's
religious position, but all the great Anglican divines had thought so
before me. They had thought so, and they had acted accordingly. And
therefore I said, with much propriety, that I had not done it simply
out of my own head, but that I was following the track, or rather
reproducing the teaching, of those who had preceded me.

I was pleading guilty; but pleading also that there were extenuating
circumstances in the case. We all know the story of the convict, who
on the scaffold bit off his mother's ear. By doing so he did not deny
the fact of his own crime, for which he was to hang; but he said that
his mother's indulgence, when he was a boy, had a good deal to do
with it. In like manner I had made a charge, and I had made it _ex
animo_; but I accused others of having led me into belie