reign in
common life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: the
long chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited,
the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies
detected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted to
their proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: what exists
in the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each
man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in
geometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the
harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must
give immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but
frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions. In every
criminal trial the first object of the prisoner is to disprove the facts
alleged, and deny the actions imputed to him: the second to prove, that,
even if these actions were real, they might be justified, as innocent
and lawful. It is confessedly by deductions of the understanding, that
the first point is ascertained: how can we suppose that a different
faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other? On the other hand,
those who would resolve all moral determinations into sentiment,
may endeavour to show, that it is impossible for reason ever to draw
conclusions of this nature. To virtue, say they, it belongs to be
amiable, and vice odious. This forms their very nature or essence. But
can reason or argumentation distribute these different epithets to any
subjects, and pronounce beforehand, that this must produce love,
and that hatred? Or what other reason can we ever assign for these
affections, but the original fabric and formation of the human mind,
which is naturally adapted to receive them?
The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by
proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue,
beget correspondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and
embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from inferences and
conclusions of the understanding, which of themselves have no hold of
the affections or set in motion the active powers of men? They discover
truths: but where the truths which they discover are indifferent, and
beget no desire or aversion, they can have no influence on conduct and
behaviour. What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is
noble, what is generous, takes p
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