opinion, never
will be reconciled with true philosophy. Father Malebranche,
as far as I can learn, was the first that started this
abstract theory of morals, which was afterwards adopted by
Cudworth, Clarke, and others; and as it excludes all
sentiment, and pretends to found everything on reason, it
has not wanted followers in this philosophic age. See
Section I, Appendix I. With regard to justice, the virtue
here treated of, the inference against this theory seems
short and conclusive. Property is allowed to be dependent on
civil laws; civil laws are allowed to have no other object,
but the interest of society: This therefore must be allowed
to be the sole foundation of property and justice. Not to
mention, that our obligation itself to obey the magistrate
and his laws is founded on nothing but the interests of
society. If the ideas of justice, sometimes, do not follow
the dispositions of civil law; we shall find, that these
cases, instead of objections, are confirmations of the
theory delivered above. Where a civil law is so perverse as
to cross all the interests of society, it loses all its
authority, and men judge by the ideas of natural justice,
which are conformable to those interests. Sometimes also
civil laws, for useful purposes, require a ceremony or form
to any deed; and where that is wanting, their decrees run
contrary to the usual tenour of justice; but one who takes
advantage of such chicanes, is not commonly regarded as an
honest man. Thus, the interests of society require, that
contracts be fulfilled; and there is not a more material
article either of natural or civil justice: But the omission
of a trifling circumstance will often, by law, invalidate a
contract, in foro humano, but not in foro conscientiae, as
divines express themselves. In these cases, the magistrate
is supposed only to withdraw his power of enforcing the
right, not to have altered the right. Where his intention
extends to the right, and is conformable to the interests of
society; it never fails to alter the right; a clear proof of
the origin of justice and of property, as assigned above.]
WHAT IS A MAN'S PROPERTY? Anything which it is lawful for him, and for
him alone, to use. BUT WHAT RULE HAVE WE, BY WHICH WE CAN DISTINGUISH
THESE OBJECTS? Here we mu
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