at, as every man has a strong connexion
with society, and perceives the impossibility of his solitary
subsistence, he becomes, on that account, favourable to all those habits
or principles, which promote order in society, and insure to him the
quiet possession of so inestimable a blessing, As much as we value
our own happiness and welfare, as much must we applaud the practice
of justice and humanity, by which alone the social confederacy can
be maintained, and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and
assistance.

This deduction of morals from self-love, or a regard to private
interest, is an obvious thought, and has not arisen wholly from the
wanton sallies and sportive assaults of the sceptics. To mention no
others, Polybius, one of the gravest and most judicious, as well as most
moral writers of antiquity, has assigned this selfish origin to all our
sentiments of virtue. [Footnote: Undutifulness to parents is disapproved
of by mankind, [Greek quotation inserted here]. Ingratitude for a like
reason (though he seems there to mix a more generous regard) [Greek
quotation inserted here] Lib. vi cap. 4. (Ed. Gronorius.) Perhaps the
historian only meant, that our sympathy and humanity was more enlivened,
by our considering the similarity of our case with that of the person
suffering; which is a just sentiment.] But though the solid practical
sense of that author, and his aversion to all vain subtilties, render
his authority on the present subject very considerable; yet is not
this an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and
experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory.

We frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very
distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty of
imagination would not discover any appearance of self-interest, or
find any connexion of our present happiness and security with events so
widely separated from us.

A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adversary, commands
our approbation; while in its consequences it may be acknowledged
prejudicial to our particular interest.

Where private advantage concurs with general affection for virtue, we
readily perceive and avow the mixture of these distinct sentiments,
which have a very different feeling and influence on the mind. We
praise, perhaps, with more alacrity, where the generous humane action
contributes to our particular interest: But the topics of praise, which
we i