ons to each have been, no doubt, detected, that men of the world
are apt, without any bad intention, to discover a sullen incredulity
on the head of those moral endowments, and even sometimes absolutely to
deny their existence and reality. In like manner I find, that, of old,
the perpetual cant of the STOICS and CYNICS concerning VIRTUE, their
magnificent professions and slender performances, bred a disgust in
mankind; and Lucian, who, though licentious with regard to pleasure,
is yet in other respects a very moral writer, cannot sometimes talk of
virtue, so much boasted without betraying symptoms of spleen and irony.
But surely this peevish delicacy, whence-ever it arises can never be
carried so far as to make us deny the existence of every species of
merit, and all distinction of manners and behaviour. Besides DISCRETION,
CAUTION, ENTERPRISE, INDUSTRY, ASSIDUITY, FRUGALITY, ECONOMY,
GOOD-SENSE, PRUDENCE, DISCERNMENT; besides these endowments, I say,
whose very names force an avowal of their merit, there are many others,
to which the most determined scepticism cannot for a moment refuse
the tribute of praise and approbation. TEMPERANCE, SOBRIETY, PATIENCE,
CONSTANCY, PERSEVERANCE, FORETHOUGHT, CONSIDERATENESS, SECRECY, ORDER,
INSINUATION, ADDRESS, PRESENCE OF MIND, QUICKNESS OF CONCEPTION,
FACILITY OF EXPRESSION, these, and a thousand more of the same kind, no
man will ever deny to be excellencies and perfections. As their merit
consists in their tendency to serve the person, possessed of them,
without any magnificent claim to public and social desert, we are the
less jealous of their pretensions, and readily admit them into the
catalogue of laudable qualities. We are not sensible that, by this
concession, we have paved the way for all the other moral excellencies,
and cannot consistently hesitate any longer, with regard to
disinterested benevolence, patriotism, and humanity.
It seems, indeed, certain, that first appearances are here, as usual,
extremely deceitful, and that it is more difficult, in a speculative
way, to resolve into self-love the merit which we ascribe to the selfish
virtues above mentioned, than that even of the social virtues, justice
and beneficence. For this latter purpose, we need but say, that whatever
conduct promotes the good of the community is loved, praised, and
esteemed by the community, on account of that utility and interest, of
which every one partakes; and though this affection and rega
|