ffuse over our minds a
pleasing sentiment of sympathy and humanity.

[Footnote: One may venture to affirm, that there is no human
nature, to whom the appearance of happiness (where envy or revenge has
no place) does not give pleasure, that of misery, uneasiness. This
seems inseparable from our make and constitution. But they are only more
generous minds, that are thence prompted to seek zealously the good of
others, and to have a real passion for their welfare. With men of narrow
and ungenerous spirits, this sympathy goes not beyond a slight
feeling of the imagination, which serves only to excite sentiments
of complacency or ensure, and makes them apply to the object either
honorable or dishonorable appellations. A griping miser, for instance,
praises extremely INDUSTRY and FRUGALITY even in others, and sets them,
in his estimation, above all the other virtues. He knows the good that
results from them, and feels that species of happiness with a more
lively sympathy, than any other you could represent to him; though
perhaps he would not part with a shilling to make the fortune of the
industrious man, whom he praises so highly.]

Let us suppose a person originally framed so as to have no manner of
concern for his fellow-creatures, but to regard the happiness and
misery of all sensible beings with greater indifference than even two
contiguous shades of the same colour. Let us suppose, if the prosperity
of nations were laid on the one hand, and their ruin on the other, and
he were desired to choose; that he would stand like the schoolman's ass,
irresolute and undetermined, between equal motives; or rather, like the
same ass between two pieces of wood or marble, without any inclination
or propensity to either side. The consequence, I believe, must be
allowed just, that such a person, being absolutely unconcerned, either
for the public good of a community or the private utility of others,
would look on every quality, however pernicious, or however beneficial,
to society, or to its possessor, with the same indifference as on the
most common and uninteresting object.

But if, instead of this fancied monster, we suppose a MAN to form
a judgement or determination in the case, there is to him a plain
foundation of preference, where everything else is equal; and however
cool his choice may be, if his heart be selfish, or if the persons
interested be remote from him; there must still be a choice or
distinction between what