and virtue, founded chiefly on a general usefulness.]
Thus, in whatever light we take this subject, the merit, ascribed to
the social virtues, appears still uniform, and arises chiefly from that
regard, which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to
the interests of mankind and society. If we consider the principles of
the human make, such as they appear to daily experience and observation,
we must, A PRIORI, conclude it impossible for such a creature as man to
be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures,
and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any
particular bias, that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends
to their misery is evil, without any farther regard or consideration.
Here then are the faint rudiments, at least, or outlines, of a GENERAL
distinction between actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the
person is supposed to increase, his connexion with those who are injured
or benefited, and his lively conception of their misery or happiness;
his consequent censure or approbation acquires proportionable vigour.
There is no necessity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an
old history or remote gazette, should communicate any strong feelings
of applause and admiration. Virtue, placed at such a distance, is like a
fixed star, which, though to the eye of reason it may appear as luminous
as the sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed as to affect the
senses, neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our
acquaintance or connexion with the persons, or even by an eloquent
recital of the case; our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy
enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest
sentiments of friendship and regard. These seem necessary and infallible
consequences of the general principles of human nature, as discovered in
common life and practice.
Again; reverse these views and reasonings: Consider the matter a
posteriori; and weighing the consequences, enquire if the merit of
social virtue be not, in a great measure, derived from the feelings of
humanity, with which it affects the spectators. It appears to be matter
of fact, that the circumstance of UTILITY, in all subjects, is a source
of praise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all
moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is
the SOLE source of that high regard paid to justice, f
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