dice which he brings on its
enemies and rivals. His fellow-citizens are the objects, which lie
nearest the eye, while we determine his character. And as nature has
implanted in every one a superior affection to his own country, we never
expect any regard to distant nations, where a competition arises. Not to
mention, that, while every man consults the good of his own community,
we are sensible, that the general interest of mankind is better
promoted, than any loose indeterminate views to the good of a species,
whence no beneficial action could ever result, for want of a duly
limited object, on which they could exert themselves.]

If any man from a cold insensibility, or narrow selfishness of temper,
is unaffected with the images of human happiness or misery, he must be
equally indifferent to the images of vice and virtue: As, on the other
hand, it is always found, that a warm concern for the interests of our
species is attended with a delicate feeling of all moral distinctions;
a strong resentment of injury done to men; a lively approbation of their
welfare. In this particular, though great superiority is observable
of one man above another; yet none are so entirely indifferent to the
interest of their fellow-creatures, as to perceive no distinctions
of moral good and evil, in consequence of the different tendencies of
actions and principles. How, indeed, can we suppose it possible in any
one, who wears a human heart, that if there be subjected to his censure,
one character or system of conduct, which is beneficial, and another
which is pernicious to his species or community, he will not so much
as give a cool preference to the former, or ascribe to it the smallest
merit or regard? Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish; let
private interest have ingrossed ever so much his attention; yet in
instances, where that is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel SOME
propensity to the good of mankind, and make it an object of choice, if
everything else be equal. Would any man, who is walking along, tread as
willingly on another's gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on
the hard flint and pavement? There is here surely a difference in the
case. We surely take into consideration the happiness and misery of
others, in weighing the several motives of action, and incline to the
former, where no private regards draw us to seek our own promotion or
advantage by the injury of our fellow-creatures. And if the principles
of