watch every inequality on its first
appearance; and the most severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it.
But besides, that so much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny,
and be exerted with great partialities; who can possibly be possessed
of it, in such a situation as is here supposed? Perfect equality
of possessions, destroying all subordination, weakens extremely the
authority of magistracy, and must reduce all power nearly to a level, as
well as property.

We may conclude, therefore, that, in order to establish laws for the
regulation of property, we must be acquainted with the nature and
situation of man; must reject appearances, which may be false, though
specious; and must search for those rules, which are, on the whole, most
USEFUL and BENEFICIAL. Vulgar sense and slight experience are sufficient
for this purpose; where men give not way to too selfish avidity, or too
extensive enthusiasm.

Who sees not, for instance, that whatever is produced or improved by a
man's art or industry ought, for ever, to be secured to him, in order to
give encouragement to such USEFUL habits and accomplishments? That the
property ought also to descend to children and relations, for the same
USEFUL purpose? That it may be alienated by consent, in order to beget
that commerce and intercourse, which is so BENEFICIAL to human society?
And that all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled,
in order to secure mutual trust and confidence, by which the general
INTEREST of mankind is so much promoted?

Examine the writers on the laws of nature; and you will always find,
that, whatever principles they set out with, they are sure to terminate
here at last, and to assign, as the ultimate reason for every rule which
they establish, the convenience and necessities of mankind. A concession
thus extorted, in opposition to systems, has more authority than if it
had been made in prosecution of them.

What other reason, indeed, could writers ever give, why this must be
MINE and that YOURS; since uninstructed nature surely never made any
such distinction? The objects which receive those appellations are, of
themselves, foreign to us; they are totally disjoined and separated
from us; and nothing but the general interests of society can form the
connexion.

Sometimes the interests of society may require a rule of justice in
a particular case; but may not determine any particular rule, among
several, which are all equally bene