r heedless praises. The regrets of a prince, for having
lost a day, were noble and generous: but had he intended to have spent
it in acts of generosity to his greedy courtiers, it was better lost
than misemployed after that manner.

Luxury, or a refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life, had
not long been supposed the source of every corruption in government, and
the immediate cause of faction, sedition, civil wars, and the total loss
of liberty. It was, therefore, universally regarded as a vice, and was
an object of declamation to all satirists, and severe moralists. Those,
who prove, or attempt to prove, that such refinements rather tend to the
increase of industry, civility, and arts regulate anew our MORAL as well
as POLITICAL sentiments, and represent, as laudable or innocent, what
had formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable.

Upon the whole, then, it seems undeniable, THAT nothing can bestow more
merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an
eminent degree; and THAT a PART, at least, of its merit arises from its
tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness
on human society. We carry our view into the salutary consequences
of such a character and disposition; and whatever has so benign an
influence, and forwards so desirable an end, is beheld with complacency
and pleasure. The social virtues are never regarded without their
beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful. The
happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the
mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of their
gentle dominion over the breasts of men.

How considerable a PART of their merit we ought to ascribe to their
utility, will better appear from future disquisitions; [Footnote: Sect.
III. and IV.] as well as the reason, why this circumstance has such a
command over our esteem and approbation. [Footnote: Sect. V.]

SECTION III. OF JUSTICE.

PART I.

THAT Justice is useful to society, and consequently that PART of its
merit, at least, must arise from that consideration, it would be a
superfluous undertaking to prove. That public utility is the SOLE origin
of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this
virtue are the SOLE foundation of its merit; this proposition, being
more curious and important, will better deserve our examination and
enquiry.

Let us suppose that nature has be