still so much farther widened, by
education, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come at
once under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous,
and scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny all
distinction between them. Let a man's insensibility be ever so great,
he must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and let
his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are
susceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting
an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding
that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will,
at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of
common sense and reason.
There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth
examination, concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether
they be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain
the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an
immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound
judgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every
rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty
and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and
constitution of the human species.
The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is
nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider
morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the
other hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the
beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured
to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by
deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such
confusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest
consequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in
the parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till very
lately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first
gave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered
to the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from
the same confusion.
It must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptible
of specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, are
discernible by pure reason: else, whence the many disputes that
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