, has a
right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the
provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of
private property against the encroachments of the Government.

Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a
different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like
an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the
citizens of the United States, in every State that might desire it, for
twenty years. And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect
it in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done
in plain words--too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found
in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over
slave-property, or which entitles property of that kind to less
protection than property of any other description. The only power
conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting
the owner in his rights.

Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act
of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property
of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line
therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is
therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his
family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if
they had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming
a permanent resident.

We have so far examined the case, as it stands under the Constitution of
the United States, and the powers thereby delegated to the Federal
Government.

But there is another point in the case which depends on State power and
State law. And it is contended, on the part of the plaintiff, that he is
made free by being taken to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois,
independently of his residence in the territory of the United States;
and being so made free, he was not again reduced to a state of slavery
by being brought back to Missouri.

Our notice of this part of the case will be very brief; for the
principle on which it depends was decided in this court, upon much
consideration in the case of Strader et al. _v._ Graham, reported in
10th Howard, 82. In that case, the slaves had been taken from Kentucky
to Ohio, with the consent of the owner, and afterward brought