back to
Kentucky. And this court held that their _status_ or condition, as free
or slave, depended upon the laws of Kentucky, when they were brought
back into that State, and not of Ohio; and that this court had no
jurisdiction to revise the judgment of a State court upon its own laws.
This was the point directly before the court, and the decision that this
court had not jurisdiction turned upon it, as will be seen by the report
of the case.

So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken into the State of
Illinois by his owner, and was there held as such, and brought back in
that character, his _status_, as free or slave, depended on the laws of
Missouri, and not of Illinois.

It has, however, been urged in the argument, that by the laws of
Missouri he was free on his return, and that this case, therefore, can
not be governed by the case of Strader et al. _v._ Graham, where it
appeared, by the laws of Kentucky, that the plaintiffs continued to be
slaves on their return from Ohio. But whatever doubts or opinions may,
at one time, have been entertained upon this subject, we are satisfied,
upon a careful examination of all the cases decided in the State courts
of Missouri referred to, that it is now firmly settled by the decisions
of the highest court in the State, that Scott and his family upon their
return were not free, but were, by the laws of Missouri, the property of
the defendant; and that the Circuit Court of the United States had no
jurisdiction, when, by the laws of the State, the plaintiff was a slave,
and not a citizen.

Moreover, the plaintiff, it appears, brought a similar action against
the defendant in the State Court of Missouri, claiming the freedom of
himself and his family upon the same grounds and the same evidence upon
which he relies in the case before the court. The case was carried
before the Supreme Court of the State; was fully argued there; and that
court decided that neither the plaintiff nor his family were entitled to
freedom, and were still the slaves of the defendant; and reversed the
judgment of the inferior State court, which had given a different
decision. If the plaintiff supposed that this judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State was erroneous, and that this court had jurisdiction
to revise and reverse it, the only mode by which he could legally bring
it before this court was by writ of error directed to the Supreme Court
of the State, requiring it to transmit the record to th