r immorality that it
ought to be openly resisted. It is obvious that the proper method of
dealing with the subject in this new aspect, is to demonstrate that the
law in question is according to the Constitution of the land; that it is
not inconsistent with the divine law; or, admitting its
unconstitutionality or immorality, that the resistance recommended is
none the less a sin against God. We do not propose to discuss either of
the two former of these propositions. The constitutionality of the law
may safely be left in the hands of the constituted authorities. It is
enough for us that there is no flagrant and manifest inconsistency
between the law and the constitution; that the first legal authorities
in the land pronounce them perfectly consistent; and that there is no
difference in principle between the present law and that of 1793 on the
same subject, in which the whole country has acquiesced for more than
half a century. We would also say that after having read some of the
most labored disquisitions designed to prove that the fugitive slave
bill subverts the fundamental principles of our federal compact, we have
been unable to discover the least force in the arguments adduced.

As to the immorality of the law, so far as we can discover, the whole
stress of the argument in the affirmative rests on two assumptions.
First, that the law of God in Deuteronomy, expressly forbids the
restoration of a fugitive slave to his owner; and secondly, that slavery
itself being sinful, it must be wrong to enforce the claims of the
master to the service of the slave. As to the former of these
assumptions, we would simply remark, that the venerable Prof. Stuart in
his recent work, "Conscience and the Constitution," has clearly proved
that the law in Deuteronomy has no application to the present case. The
thing there forbidden is the restoration of a slave who had fled from a
heathen master and taken refuge among the worshipers of the true God.
Such a man was not to be forced back into heathenism. This is the
obvious meaning and spirit of the command. That it has no reference to
slaves who had escaped from Hebrew masters, and fled from one tribe or
city to another, is plain from the simple fact that the Hebrew laws
recognized slavery. It would be a perfect contradiction if the law
authorized the purchase and holding of slaves, and yet forbid the
enforcing the right of possession. There could be no such thing as
slavery, in such a land