g some great principle or some question of conscience, such
decisions must be held to be final, and to bind all concerned not only
to submission but obedience. A law thus sanctioned becomes instinct with
all the power of the state, and further opposition brings the recusants
into conflict with the government; a conflict in which no man for light
reasons can with a good conscience engage. Still it can not be denied,
and ought not to be concealed, that the ultimate decision must be
referred to his own judgment. This is a necessary deduction from the
doctrine that obedience to law is a religious duty. It is a primary
principle that the right of private judgment extends over all questions
of faith and morals. No human power can come between God and the
conscience. Every man must answer for his own sins, and therefore every
man must have the right to determine for himself what is sin. As he can
not transfer his responsibility, he can not transfer his right of
judgment. This principle has received the sanction of good men in every
age of the world. Daniel judged for himself of the binding force of the
command not to worship the true God. So did the apostles when they
continued to preach Christ, in opposition to all the constituted
authorities. The laws passed by Pagan Rome requiring the worship of
idols had the sanction of all the authorities of the empire, yet on the
ground of their private judgment the Christians refused to obey them.
Protestants in like manner refused to obey the laws of Papal Rome,
though sustained by all the authority both of the church and state. In
all these cases the right of private judgment can not be disputed. Even
where no question of religion or morality is directly concerned, this
right is undeniable. Does any one now condemn Hampden for refusing to
pay "ship-money?" Does any American condemn our ancestors for resisting
the stamp-act, though the authorities of St. Stephen's and Westminster
united in pronouncing the imposition constitutional? However this
principle may be regarded when stated in the abstract, every individual
instinctively acts upon it in his own case. Whenever a command is issued
by one in authority over us, we immediately and almost unconsciously
determine for ourselves, first, whether he had a right to give the
order; and secondly, whether it can with a good conscience be obeyed. If
this decision is clearly in the negative, we at once determine to refuse
obedience on our own res