bove, but in the sense assumed
in the objection, because his children are under the same obligation of
service as the parent. The hereditary character of slavery, however,
does not arise out of the idea of the slave as a chattel or thing, a
mere matter of property, it depends on the organization of society. In
England one man is born a peer, another a commoner; in Russia one man is
born a noble, another a serf; here, one is born a free citizen, another
a disfranchised outcast (the free colored man), and a third a slave.
These forms of society, as before remarked, are not necessarily, or in
themselves, either just or unjust; but become the one or the other,
according to circumstances. Under a state of things in which the best
interests of the community would be promoted by the British or Russian
organization, they would be just and acceptable to God; but under
circumstances in which they would be injurious, they would be unjust. It
is absolutely necessary, however, to discriminate between an
organization essentially vicious, and one which, being in itself
indifferent, may be right or wrong, according to circumstances. On the
same principle, therefore, that a human being in England is deprived, by
the mere accident of birth, of the right of suffrage, and in Russia has
the small portion of liberty which belongs to a commoner, or the still
smaller belonging to a serf, in this country one class is by birth
invested with all the rights of citizenship, another (females) is
deprived all political and many personal rights, and a third of even
their personal liberty. Whether this organization be right or wrong, is
not now the question. We are simply showing that the fact that the
children of slaves become by birth slaves, is not to be referred to the
idea of the master's property in the body and soul of the parent, but
results from the form of society, and is analagous to other social
institutions, as far as the principle is concerned, that children take
the rank, or the political or social condition of the parent.

We prefer being chargeable with the sin of wearisome repetition, to
leaving any room for the misapprehension of our meaning. We, therefore,
again remark that we are discussing the mere abstract morality of these
forms of social organization, and not their expediency. We have in view
the vindication of the character of the inspired writings and inspired
men from the charge of having overlooked the blackest of human crim