e, and is of the nature of property, and is consequently
liable for the debts of the owner, and subject to his disposal by will
or otherwise. It is probable that the slave is called the property of
his master in the statute books, for the same reason that children are
called the servants of the parents, or that wives are said to be the
same person with their husbands, and to have no separate existence of
their own. These are mere technicalities, designed to facilitate certain
legal processes. Calling a child a servant, does not alter his relation
to his father; and a wife is still a woman, though the courts may rule
her out of existence. In like manner, where the law declares, that a
slave shall be deemed and adjudged to be a chattel personal in the hands
of his master, it does not alter his nature, nor does it confer on the
master any right to use him in a manner inconsistent with that nature.
As there are certain moral principles which direct how brutes are to be
used by those to whom they belong, so there are fixed principles which
determine how a man may be used. These legal enactments, therefore, are
not intended to legislate away the nature of the slave, as a human
being; they serve to facilitate the transfer of the master's claim of
service, and to render that claim the more readily liable for his debts.
The transfer of authority and claim of service from one master to
another, is, in principle, analagous to transfer of subjects from one
sovereign to another. This is a matter of frequent occurrence. By the
treaty of Vienna, for example, a large part of the inhabitants of
central Europe changed masters. Nearly half of Saxony was transferred to
Prussia; Belgium was annexed to Holland. In like manner, Louisiana was
transferred from France to the United States. In none of these cases
were the people consulted. Yet in all, a claim of service more or less
extended, was made over from one power to another. There was a change of
masters. The mere transferable character of the master's claim to the
slave, does not convert the latter into a thing, or degrade him from his
rank as a human being. Nor does the fact that he is bound to serve for
life, produce this effect. It is only property in his time for life,
instead of for a term of years. The nature of the relation is not
determined by the period of its continuance.

It has, however, been argued that the slave is the property of his
master, not only in the sense admitted a