fered no parallel to the exigencies
to which the privateer was liable. They were not run down, uninjured,
in a fair race. The only sloop so lost was the "Frolic," of the class
of the "Wasp" and "Peacock;" and the circumstances under which she was
caught by a frigate are not sufficiently known to pronounce whether
she might have been saved, as her sister ship, the "Hornet," was, from
the hot pursuit of a seventy-four. Under some conditions of wind and
sea, inferiority of bulk inflicts irredeemable disadvantage of speed;
but, taking one thing with another, in a system of commerce destroying
which rejected squadron action, and was based avowedly upon
dissemination of vessels, the gain of the frigate over the sloop due
to size did not counterbalance the loss in distribution of effort
which results from having only one ship, instead of two, for a first
outlay.

That some such convictions, the fruit of rude experience in actual
cruising, were gradually forming in men's understanding, is probable
from the particulars cited; and they would receive additional force
from the consideration that, to make a profit out of privateering
under existing conditions, it would be necessary, not only to capture
vessels of weak force, but to return safely to port with at least some
notable salvage from their cargoes. In other words, there must be
power to fight small cruisers, and to escape large ones under all
probable disadvantage of weather. Whatever the conclusions of
practical seamen and shipowners in this respect, they found no
reflection in the dominant power in the Administration and Congress.
The exploits of the "Comet," the "Chasseur," and a few other fortunate
privateer schooners or brigs of small size, among them being cited
specifically the "Mammoth," which in the autumn of 1814 made
twenty-one prizes in three months, produced a strong popular
impression; and this was diligently but somewhat thoughtlessly
deepened by the press, as such popular movements are apt to be,
without thorough mastery of all facts, _contra_ as well as _pro_. It
was undeniable, also, that in the threatening aspect of affairs, when
Great Britain's whole strength was freed to be exerted against the
country, want of time to prepare new means was a weighty element in
decision, and recourse must be had to resources immediately at hand
for the retaliatory depredation upon the enemy's commerce, from the
effect of which so much was expected then, as it is now. Fo