tude which has produced this
letter, but my confidence in your patriotism, skill, judgment, and
energy is entire." On August 3, however, he says the explanation about
blocks and ironwork--apparently just received--is so extraordinary at
such a moment that "I cannot withhold from you the extreme anxiety and
astonishment which the protracted and fatal delay of the squadron has
excited in the mind of the President;" and on the 5th, "the known
detention of the squadron at Sackett's Harbor until the 27th ultimo,
the very feeble and precarious state of your health, the evils which
have already resulted from delay," etc., "have induced the President,
though with extreme reluctance, and undiminished confidence in your
zeal and capacity, to order Commodore Decatur to proceed to Sackett's
Harbor and take upon himself the naval command on Lake Ontario."
The proposed change did not take place, the squadron having already
resumed active cruising. The Secretary repeated his expressions of
confidence, but does not appear to have renewed his recommendations to
Congress. Chauncey, stung by the reflections, open and implied, upon
his conduct, retorted with a defence and definition of his course, as
proposed and realized, which raises the whole question of the method
of naval co-operation under the circumstances, and of its probable
effectiveness. Replying to Brown's letter of July 13, quoted above, he
said positively that he had never given the general ground to expect
him at the head of the lake.[304] This assertion he repeated to the
Secretary, whose letters to him demonstrate that the Government had
left him entire discretion as to his particular method of procedure.
Acting therefore upon his own judgment, he justified his course by
alleging that direct co-operation at the Niagara end of the lake was
impossible, because the heavy ships could not get within two miles of
the forts, and Brown's army had never advanced to the lake shore;
consequently, the fleet could neither have acted directly by itself,
nor yet in support of a land force, with which it could not
communicate. So much for the negative side of the argument.
Positively, he said, the mission of the navy was to seek and fight the
enemy's squadron; and this duty was emphasized by the fact that to go
westward to Niagara, while the enemy was at Kingston, would expose to
capture Sackett's Harbor, the safety of which had remained a dominant
anxiety with Chauncey since its narrow
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