ifested that he did not possess
the steadying military qualities necessary to play the role of a
distant commander-in-chief. Izard, at the time of his appointment,
reported everything connected with his command, the numbers and
discipline of the troops, their clothing and equipment, in a
deplorable state of inefficiency.[331] The summer months were spent in
building up anew the army on Champlain, and in erecting
fortifications; at Plattsburg, where the main station was fixed, and
at Cumberland Head, the promontory which defines the eastern side of
Plattsburg Bay. Upon the maintenance of these positions depended the
tenure of the place itself, as the most suitable advanced base for the
army and for the fleet, mutually indispensable for the protection of
that great line of operations.
On July 27, before the Secretary could know of Lundy's Lane, but when
he did anticipate that Brown must fall back on Fort Erie, he wrote to
Izard that it would be expedient for him to advance against Montreal,
or against Prescott,--on the St. Lawrence opposite Ogdensburg,--in
case large re-enforcements had been sent from Montreal to check
Brown's advance, as was reported. His own inclination pointed to
Prescott, with a view to the contingent chance of an attack upon
Kingston, in co-operation with Chauncey and the garrison at
Sackett's.[332] This letter did not reach Izard till August 10. He
construed its somewhat tentative and vacillating terms as an order. "I
will make the movement you direct, if possible; but I shall do it
with the apprehension of risking the force under my command, and with
the certainty that everything in this vicinity, save the lately
erected works at Plattsburg and Cumberland Head, will, in less than
three days after my departure, be in possession of the enemy."[333]
Izard, himself, on July 19, had favored a step like this proposed;
but, as he correctly observed, the time for it was when Brown was
advancing and might be helped. Now, when Brown had been brought to a
stand, and was retiring, the movement would not aid him, but would
weaken the Champlain frontier; and that at the very moment when the
divisions from Wellington's army, which had embarked at Bordeaux, were
arriving at Quebec and Montreal.
On August 12, Armstrong wrote again, saying that his first order had
been based upon the supposition that Chauncey would meet and beat Yeo,
or at least confine him in port. This last had in fact been done; but,
if the
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