usand men, all of whom
except four hundred were militia; that he could not collect more than
half his men until a day or two previously to the engagement, and six
or seven hundred of them did not arrive until fifteen minutes before
its commencement; ... that the officers commanding the troops were
generally unknown to him, and but a very small number of them had
enjoyed the benefit of military instruction or experience." So far
from attributing censure, the Court found that, "taking into
consideration the complicated difficulties and embarrassments under
which he labored, he is entitled to no little commendation,
notwithstanding the result; before the action he exhibited industry,
zeal, and talent, and during its continuance a coolness, a
promptitude, and a personal valor, highly honorable to himself."

The finding of a court composed of competent experts, convened shortly
after the events, must be received with respect. It is clear, however,
that they here do not specify the particular professional merits of
Winder's conduct of operations, but only the general hopelessness of
success, owing to the antecedent conditions, not of his making, under
which he was called to act, and which he strenuously exerted himself
to meet. The blame for a mishap evidently and easily preventible still
remains, and, though of course not expressed by the Court, is
necessarily thrown back upon the Administration, and upon the party
represented by it, which had held power for over twelve years past. A
hostile corps of less than five thousand men had penetrated to the
capital, through a well populated country, which was, to quote the
Secretary of War, "covered with wood, and offering at every step
strong positions for defence;"[369] but there were neither defences
nor defenders.

The sequence of events which terminated in this humiliating manner is
instructive. The Cabinet, which on June 7 had planned offensive
operations in Canada, met on July 1 in another frame of mind, alarmed
by the news from Europe, to plan for the defence of Washington and
Baltimore. It will be remembered that it was now two years since war
had been declared. In counting the force on which reliance might be
placed for meeting a possible enemy, the Secretary of War thought he
could assemble one thousand regulars, independent of artillerists in
the forts.[2] The Secretary of the Navy could furnish one hundred and
twenty marines, and the crews of Barney's flotilla, estima