und under such a
cannonade, knowing that a hostile squadron awaited them without. Even
at such random range, a disabling shot in hull or spars must be
expected. At whatever risk, departure is enforced.
[Illustration: Tracing from pencil sketch of Battle of L.
Champlain, made by Com. Macdonough on back of a letter of
inquiry, addressed to him within a year of the action.
The names are not in the sketch; but with the letters, express
the author's understanding of the Commodore's meaning.]
To a similar letter from Colden, General Macomb replied that he did
not think the squadron within range. There is also a statement in
Niles' Register[417] that several British officers visited Macomb at
Plattsburg, and at their request experiments were made, presumably
trial shots, to ascertain whether the guns of the forts could have
annoyed the American squadron. It was found they could not. Macomb's
opinion may have rested upon this, and the conclusion may be just; but
it is open to remark that, as the squadron was not then there, its
assumed position depended upon memory,--like Macdonough's sketch.
Macomb said further, that "a fruitless attempt was made during the
action to elevate the guns so as to bear on the enemy; but none were
fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond their reach."
The worth of this conviction is shown by the next remark, which he
repeated under date of August 1, 1815.[418] "This opinion was
strengthened by observations on the actual range of the guns of the
'Confiance'--her heaviest metal [24-pounders] falling upwards of five
hundred yards short of the shore." The "Confiance" was five hundred
yards further off than the American squadron, and to reach it her guns
would be elevated for that distance only. Because under such condition
they dropped their shot five hundred yards short of three thousand
five hundred yards, it is scarcely legitimate to infer that guns
elevated for three thousand could not carry so far.
The arguments having been stated, it is to be remarked that, whatever
the truth, it is knowledge after the fact as far as Prevost was
concerned. In his report dated September 11, 1814, the day of the
action, he speaks of the difficulties which had been before him; among
them "blockhouses armed with _heavy_ ordnance." This he then believed;
and whether this ordnance could reach the squadron he could only know
by trying. It was urgently proper, in view of his large land
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