iews of the ministry as to rectification of frontier.
Stated briefly, the chain of the Great Lakes was asserted to be a
military barrier essential to the security of Canada, as the weaker
community in North America. To assure it, no territorial cession was
required; but the lakes should be in the sole military tenure of Great
Britain. The United States might use them freely for commercial
purposes, but should maintain on them no ship of war, nor build any
fortification on their shores, or within a certain distance, to be
fixed by agreement. In addition to this, on the side of the lower St.
Lawrence, there was to be such a cession of the northern part of Maine
as would establish a direct communication between Quebec and Halifax.
The American reply of August 24[496] discussed these questions,
patiently but instructively. The matters involved were made plain for
the American reader, and the paper closed with the clear intimation
that before such terms were accepted there must be a great deal more
fighting. "It is not necessary to refer such demands to the American
Government for instructions. They will only be a fit subject of
deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide upon the expediency
of an absolute surrender of national independence." So far as the
British proposals went, the question was military, not diplomatic; for
soldiers and seamen to decide, not for negotiators.
So it stood, and so in the solution it proved. The American
commissioners held firm to this ground; while on the part of the British
there was thenceforth a continual effort to escape from a false
position, or to temporize, until some favorable change of circumstances
might enable them to insist. "The substance of the question," wrote
Castlereagh to the prime minister, "is, are we prepared to continue the
war for territorial arrangements. If not, is this the best time to make
peace, or is it desirable to take the chances of the campaign and then
to be governed by circumstances?"[497] "If our campaign in Canada should
be as successful as our military preparations would lead us to expect,"
... replied Liverpool, "if our commander does his duty, I am persuaded
we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the Canadian frontier,
which we ought to insist on keeping."[498]
By these considerations the next British note was dictated, and
presented September 4.[499] It simply argued the question, with
dilatory design, in a somewhat minatory tone. "I
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