think it not
unlikely," Liverpool had written with reference to it, "that the
American commissioners will propose to refer the subject to their
Government. In that case, the negotiation may be adjourned till the
answer is received, and we shall know the result of the campaign
before it can be resumed." But the Americans did not refer. They too
needed time for their people to learn what now was the purpose of
hostilities, which the British envoys had precipitately stated as an
indispensable concession, and to manifest the national temper under
the changed circumstances; but they did not choose that the matter
should be stated as one open to discussion. They knew well enough the
harassment of maintaining a land warfare three thousand miles from
Great Britain, as well as the dangers threatening the European
situation and embarrassing the British ministry. They in turn
discussed at length, scrutinizing historically the several arguments
of their opponents; but their conclusion was foregone. The two
propositions--first, of assigning "a definite boundary to the Indians
living within the limit of the United States, beyond which boundary
they [the United States] should stipulate not to acquire any
territory; secondly, of securing the exclusive military possession of
the lakes to Great Britain--are both inadmissible. We cannot subscribe
to, and would deem useless to refer to our Government, any arrangement
containing either of these propositions." The British Government was
not permitted any subterfuge to escape from the premature insistence
upon cession of territory made by their envoys, which would tend to
unite the people in America; nor was it to be anticipated that
prolonged hostilities for such an object would be acceptable in Great
Britain.

The pre-eminence given to the Indian question by Great Britain in
these negotiations was due to the importance attached by British local
officials to the aid of the savages in war, and to a sensitive
conviction that, when thus utilized, they should not be abandoned in
peace. Their military value was probably over-estimated. It consisted
chiefly in numbers, in which the British were inferior, and in the
terror produced by their cruelties; doubtless, also, in some degree to
their skill in woodcraft; but they were not dependable. Such as it
was, their support went usually to the weaker party; not because the
Indian naturally sided with the weaker, but because he instinctively
recogniz