rican Government had
made the mistake of being unwilling to insure it by due and timely
preparation for war. In these advances, therefore, its adversary
naturally saw not magnanimity, but apprehension. Russell, in reporting
his final interview, wrote, "Lord Castlereagh once observed somewhat
loftily, that if the American Government was so anxious _to get rid of
the war_,[477] it would have an opportunity of doing so on learning
the revocation of the Orders in Council." The American representative
rejoined with proper spirit; but the remark betrayed the impression
produced by this speedy offer, joined to the notorious military
unreadiness of the United States. Such things do not make for peace.
The British ministry, like a large part of the American people, saw in
the declaration of war a mere variation upon the intermittent policy
of commercial restrictions of the past five years; an attempt to
frighten by bluster. In such spirit Monroe, in this very letter of
June 26 to Russell, had dwelt upon the many advantages to be derived
from peace with the United States; adding, "not to mention the
injuries which cannot fail to result from a prosecution of the war."
In transcribing his instructions, Russell discreetly omitted the
latter phrase; but the omission, like the words themselves, betrays
consciousness that the Administration was faithful to the tradition of
its party, dealing in threats rather than in deeds. Through great part
of the final negotiations the impression thus made remained with the
British ministers.

On September 20, 1812, the Chancellor of the Russian Empire requested
a visit from the American minister resident at St. Petersburg, Mr.
John Quincy Adams. In the consequent interview, the next evening, the
Chancellor said that the Czar, having recently made peace and
re-established commercial intercourse with Great Britain, was much
concerned that war should have arisen almost immediately between her
and the United States. Hostilities between the two nations, which
together nearly monopolized the carrying trade of the world, would
prevent the economical benefits to Russia expected from the recent
change in her political relations. The question was then asked,
whether a proffer of Russian mediation would be regarded favorably by
the United States. Adams had not yet received official intelligence
even of the declaration of war, and was without information as to the
views of his Government on the point suggeste