he morning of January 1 they opened
with thirty pieces at a distance of five hundred yards; but it was
soon found that in such a duel they were hopelessly overmatched, a
result to which contributed the enfilading position of the naval
battery. "To the well-directed exertions from the other side of the
river," wrote Jackson to Patterson, after the close of the operations,
"must be ascribed in great measure that harassment of the enemy which
led to his ignominious flight." The British guns were silenced, and
for the moment abandoned; but during the night they were either
withdrawn or destroyed. It was thus demonstrated that no adequate
antecedent impression could be made on the American lines by
cannonade; and, as neither flank could be turned, no resource
remained, on the east shore at least, but direct frontal assault.

But while Jackson's main position was thus secure, he ran great risk
that the enemy, by crossing the river, and successful advance there,
might establish themselves in rear of his works; which, if effected,
would put him at the same disadvantage that the naval battery now
imposed upon his opponents. His lines would be untenable if his
antagonist commanded the water, or gained the naval battery on his
flank, to which the crew of the "Louisiana" and her long guns had now
been transferred. This the British also perceived, and began to
improve a narrow canal which then led from the head of the bayou to
the levee, but was passable by canoes only. They expected ultimately
to pierce the levee, and launch barges upon the river; but the work
was impeded by the nature of the soil, the river fell, and some of the
heavier boats grounding delayed the others, so that, at the moment of
final assault, only five hundred men had been transported instead of
thrice that number, as intended.[456] What these few effected showed
how real and great was the danger.

The canal was completed on the evening of January 6, on which day the
last re-enforcements from England, sixteen hundred men under
Major-General Lambert, reached the front. Daylight of January 8 was
appointed for the general assault; the intervening day and night being
allowed for preparations, and for dragging forward the boats into the
river. It was expected that the whole crossing party of fifteen
hundred, under Colonel Thornton, would be on the west bank, ready to
move forward at the same moment as the principal assault, which was
also to be supported by all th