r territorial
arrangements?" "Is it desirable to take the chances of the campaign, and
then be governed by circumstances?"[396] The last sentence defines the
policy actually followed; and the chances went definitely against it
when Macdonough destroyed the British fleet on Lake Champlain. Except at
Baltimore and New Orleans,--mere defensive successes,--nothing but
calamity befell the American arms. To the battle of Lake Champlain it
was owing that the British occupancy of United States soil at the end of
the year was such that the Duke of Wellington advised that no claim for
territorial cession could be considered to exist, and that the basis of
_uti possidetis_, upon which it was proposed to treat, was
untenable.[397] The earnestness of the Government, however, in seeking
the changes specified, is indicated by the proposition seriously made to
the Duke to take the command in America.
Owing to the military conditions hitherto existing on the American
continent, the power to take the offensive throughout the lake
frontier had rested with the United States Government; and the
direction given by this to its efforts had left Lake Champlain
practically out of consideration. Sir George Prevost, being thrown on
the defensive, could only conform to the initiative of his adversary.
For these reasons, whatever transactions took place in this quarter up
to the summer of 1814 were in characteristic simply episodes; an
epithet which applies accurately to the more formidable, but brief,
operations here in 1814, as also to those in Louisiana. Whatever
intention underlay either attempt, they were in matter of fact almost
without any relations of antecedent or consequent. They stood by
themselves, and not only may, but should, be so considered. Prior to
them, contemporary reference to Lake Champlain, or to Louisiana, is
both rare and casual. For this reason, mention of earlier occurrences
in either of these quarters has heretofore been deferred, as
irrelevant and intrusive if introduced among other events, with which
they coincided in time, but had no further connection. A brief
narrative of them will now be presented, as a necessary introduction
to the much more important incidents of 1814.
At the beginning of hostilities the balance of naval power on Lake
Champlain rested with the United States, and so continued until June,
1813. The force on each side was small to triviality, nor did either
make any serious attempt to obtain a ma
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