, 1814. Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, p. 240.

[339] Izard Correspondence, p. 102; Cruikshank, p. 242.

[340] Cruikshank, p. 240.

[341] Izard Correspondence, p. 103.

[342] Captains' Letters.

[343] Canadian Archives, C. 685, pp. 172-174.

[344] Ibid., M. 389.6, p. 222.

[345] The Reports of Captain Dobbs and the American lieutenant,
Conkling, are in Cruikshank's Documentary History, p. 135.

[346] Captains' Letters, Sept. 12, 1814.

[347] This account of naval events on the upper lakes in 1814 has been
summarized from Sinclair's despatches, Captains' Letters, May 2 to Nov.
11, 1814, and from certain captured British letters, which, with several
of Sinclair's, were published in Niles' Register, vol. vii. and
Supplement.

CHAPTER XVI

SEABOARD OPERATIONS IN 1814. WASHINGTON, BALTIMORE, AND
MAINE

The British command of the water on Lake Ontario was obtained too late
in the year 1814 to have any decisive effect upon their operations.
Combined with their continued powerlessness on Lake Erie, this caused
their campaign upon the northern frontier to be throughout defensive
in character, as that of the Americans had been offensive. Drummond
made no attempt in the winter to repeat the foray into New York of the
previous December, although he and Prevost both considered that they
had received provocation to retaliate, similar to that given at Newark
the year before. The infliction of such vindictive punishment was by
them thrown upon Warren's successor in the North Atlantic command, who
responded in word and will even more heartily than in deed. The
Champlain expedition, in September of this year, had indeed offensive
purpose, but even there the object specified was the protection of
Canada, by the destruction of the American naval establishments on the
lake, as well as at Sackett's Harbor;[348] while the rapidity with
which Prevost retreated, as soon as the British squadron was
destroyed, demonstrated how profoundly otherwise the spirit of a
simple defensive had possession of him, as it had also of the more
positive and aggressive temperaments of Drummond and Yeo, and how
essential naval control was in his eyes. In this general view he had
the endorsement of the Duke of Wellington, when his attention was
called to the subject, after the event.

Upon the seaboard it was otherwise. There the British campaign of 1814
much exceeded that of 1813 in offensive purpose and vigor, and in
effect. Thi