temper in which to effect military objects. It
is indeed hard to believe that an army so little numerous as that of
Brown could have accomplished the ambitious designs confided to it;
but that does not affect the clear duty of affording it the utmost
assistance that ingenuity could devise and energy effect. The words
quoted were written August 10, but ignore entirely an alternative
suggested in a letter received that day from the Secretary, dated July
24, itself the repetition of one made July 20: "To destroy the enemy's
fleet, or to blockade his force _and cut off his entire communication
with the head of the lake_." The civilian here indicated clearly what
the naval officer should have known from the very first moment.
As before said, the contemporary correspondence of British officers
abundantly shows their anxiety lest Chauncey, in these important
weeks, should do what he did not do. Sir James Yeo had deliberately
formulated the policy of remaining inactive in Kingston until the
completion of the 102-gun ship, which would give him command of the
lake beyond chance of dispute. To occupy the American fleet meanwhile
with a local blockade, which he intended not to contest, was precisely
what he wanted. To distress the army at Niagara to the point of
evacuating the peninsula was the one only thing that might impel--or
compel--him to come out and fight, despite his deliberate intention.
"Several small vessels," wrote the Commissary-General a month
later[305] to Sir George Prevost, "were despatched while the enemy's
squadron were unable to leave Sackett's Harbor; but since the enemy
commands the lake, that resource for the moment is cut off, and only
batteaux can be employed. These are [not][306] a very useful
conveyance, not only from the danger of the enemy's small vessels,
which can approach the shore without difficulty, but also from want of
proper steersmen, pilots, and middlemen.... This feeble means of
transport will never effect the forming of a sufficient depot at York,
Burlington Heights, and Niagara; and, unless the commissariat can be
aided to a great extent by the Royal Navy, the most disastrous
consequences must ensue."
At the date this was written, August 27, Chauncey's force was that
which he had promised should be ready July 1, but with which he did
not sail until August 1,--too late. The very efficiency of his action
in August condemns therefore his inaction in July. Besides his two new
big ships, w
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