officer,
to whom, as to a common superior, were issued orders involving the
action of the three.

This disposition recognized implicitly the fact that the forts, taken
together, constituted a distinct element in the general British scheme
of operations. Fort Niagara by position threatened the line of
communications of any American army seeking to act on the Canadian
side. An effective garrison there, unless checked by an adequate force
stationed for the particular purpose, could move at any unexpected
moment against the magazines or trains on the American side; and it
was impossible to anticipate what number might be thus employed at a
given time, because intercourse between Niagara and George was open.
If by original or acquired superiority of numbers, as had been the
case in 1813, the American general should push his opponent back
towards the head of the lake, Fort George would in turn become an
additional menace to his communications. Therefore, properly to
initiate a campaign for the command of the Niagara peninsula, in 1814,
it would be necessary either to reduce both these works, which, if
they were properly garrisoned, meant an expenditure of time; or else
to blockade them by a large detachment of troops, which meant a
constant expenditure of force, diminishing that available for
operations in the field. The British military situation thus comprised
two factors, distinct but complementary; the active army in the field,
and the stationary fortifications which contributed to its support by
sheltering its supplies and menacing those of the enemy. The British
commander of the district, Lieutenant-General Drummond, estimated that
the blockaders before either fort, being ever on the defensive against
a sortie which they could not foresee, must in numbers considerably
exceed the besieged, covered as these were by their works, and able to
receive re-enforcement from the opposite shore. Consequently, when the
officer in immediate local control, Major-General Riall, embarrassed
by the smallness of his field force, suggested the destruction of Fort
Niagara, except a citadel of restricted extent, needing a less
numerous garrison, his superior replied that not only would such
smaller work be much more easily taken, but that in every event the
loss through holding the place was more than compensated by the
danger and the precautions entailed upon the enemy.[267]

The inactivity, substantially unbroken, which prevailed throug