nd,
take Mackinac, and what is gained but Mackinac itself?"[292] The
reasoning was indisputable, although Armstrong acquiesced in the
decision of the Cabinet. The main feature of the plan adopted, the
reduction of Burlington Heights and a successful advance on York, was
of doubtful issue; but, if successful, the vital end of the chain upon
which Mackinac depended for existence dropped useless to the ground.
All side enterprise that did not directly contribute to this decisive
movement should have been discarded in favor of concentration upon
Brown's army, to which its execution was committed, and the actual
strength of which was insufficient for the task. At the opening of the
campaign its total strength was four thousand seven hundred and
eighty, of whom eight hundred and thirty were militia.[293] On July 1
there were present for duty three thousand five hundred. There were
also six hundred Indians of the Six Nations. In this impotent
conclusion resulted the Secretary's estimate of five thousand regulars
and three thousand volunteers.

On July 2 Brown announced to his troops that he was authorized by the
Government to put them in motion against the enemy.[294] He had
decided to leave Fort Niagara, with its menace to his communications,
in his rear, unguarded, and to throw his command directly upon the
enemy on the west bank of the river. The crossing was made that night
in two divisions; one landing opposite Black Rock, below Fort Erie,
the other above that post, which surrendered July 3, at 5 P.M. The
garrison numbered one hundred and thirty-seven. From there Brown
proposed to turn north and advance towards Ontario, where he hoped to
join hands with the navy, which was expected by him, and by the
Government, to be on hand to co-operate. This expectation was based on
Chauncey's own assurance that he would take the lake on July 1, if
supplied with men, who were known since to have arrived. It does not
appear, however, that he had received specific instructions as to the
course he was intended to follow; and, in assuming that he would go to
the head of the lake, for direct co-operation, the Government and the
general were reckoning without their host, and in ignorance of his
views. He was as loath to leave Kingston and Sackett's in his rear,
unwatched, as Brown was willing to take the same risk with regard to
Niagara. It was a profound difference of temperament in two capable
men, to whom the Government failed to impart