I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly
see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed
conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a
mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can
conceive them EXISTING OUT OF THE MINDS OF ALL SPIRITS.

PHIL. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any
one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in the mind?

HYL. I do.

PHIL. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which
you cannot so much as conceive?

HYL. I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some
scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I SEE THINGS at a distance?
Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way
off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?

PHIL. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?

HYL. I do.

PHIL. And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?

HYL. They have.

PHIL. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be
without the mind?

HYL. By no means.

PHIL. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are
without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are
perceived.

HYL. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?

PHIL. By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive,
neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the
mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain
sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are
without the mind.

HYL. True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests
something of OUTNESS OR DISTANCE?

PHIL. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure
change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?

HYL. They are in a continual change.

PHIL. Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the
visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be
perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series
of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your
approach.

HYL. It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object
I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no
matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of
distance sugge