HING IN GENERAL, which
being interpreted proves NOTHING. So Matter comes to nothing. What
think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?

HYL. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being
able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.

PHIL. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other
circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing
not immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue
against the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and
positive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all
this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the
existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it;
where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from
Spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as the most
inadequate or faint idea pretended to--I will not indeed thence conclude
against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my
inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words
to no manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever.
And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.

HYL. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in
themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to
produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends
demonstration. I find myself relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know
not what, MATTER.

PHIL. But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to
take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind? Let a
visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any
imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it
will not be distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so well
grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of
prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a
sudden to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is
need of time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a
frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in
different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat
and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in
pretending to maintain you know not what,