those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said
of all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the
world. They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible
qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or
know anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

PHIL. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example,
from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

HYL. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own
ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think
you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses,
and have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to
distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind,
you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of
a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

PHIL. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of
things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I
wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

HYL. Even so.

PHIL. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on,
and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is,
but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life,
as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they
are conversant about.

HYL. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a
nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes,
and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But
philosophers know better things.

PHIL. You mean, they KNOW that they KNOW NOTHING.

HYL. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

PHIL. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you
seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you
are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like
another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

HYL. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any
one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen,
ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I
declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every
other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we a